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Abstract
We consider a general formulation of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem with a
continuous payment and a lump-sum payment at termination. In the European version of the
problem, the random horizon is chosen solely by the principal with no other possible action
from the agent than exerting effort on the dynamics of the output process. We also consider
the American version of the contract, which covers the seminal Sannikov [San08] model,
where the agent can also quit by optimally choosing the termination time of the contract.
Our main result reduces such non-zero-sum stochastic differential games to appropriate
stochastic control problems which may be solved by standard methods of stochastic control
theory. This reduction is obtained by following the Sannikov [San08] approach, further
developed in [CPT18]. We first introduce an appropriate class of contracts for which the
agent’s optimal effort is immediately characterized by the standard verification argument in
stochastic control theory. We then show that this class of contracts is dense in an appropriate
sense, so that the optimization over this restricted family of contracts represents no loss of
generality. The result is obtained by using the recent wellposedness result of random horizon
second-order backward SDE in [LRTY18].
MSC 2010 Subject Classification: 91B40, 93E20
Key words: Moral hazard, first-best and second-best contracting, second-order backward SDE,
random horizon.
1 Introduction
The Principal-Agent problem is a classical moral hazard problem in economics with many appli-
cations in corporate governance and industrial economics, which is formulated as a Stackelberg
game. The principal (she) delegates the management of an output process to the agent (he).
A contract is signed beforehand, stipulating the terms of an incentive payment. The agent
devotes a costly effort for the management of the output. Then, given the contract offered by
the principal, he returns an optimal effort response which best balances between his cost of
effort and the proposed compensation. Finally, the principal chooses the optimal contract so as
to to incite the agent’s effort to serve her interest. A crucial feature of the problem is that the
principal only observe the output process, and has no access to the amount of effort exerted by
the agent.
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There is a huge literature on this topic, mainly in the one-period setting, we refer to the
seminal book [BD05]. The first continuous time formulation of this problem was introduced by
Holmstro¨m & Milgrom [HM87]. The importance of the continuous time formulation was best
illustrated by the simplicity of the results. Since then, there has been a stream of research in
this direction using the technique of calculus of variations. We refer to the book by Cvitanic´ &
Zhang [CZ13] for the main achievements with this point of view.
An original method was introduced by Sannikov [San08] which exploits in a very clever
way the agent dynamic value process. This method was related by Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı &
Touzi [CPT18] to the theory of backward stochastic differential equations, and extended to
the setting where the agent is allowed to control the diffusion of the out process. Such an
extension is particularly relevant in portfolio management as illustrated in Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı
& Touzi [CPT17]. We also refer to Aı¨d, Possama¨ı & Touzi [APT19] for an application to the
Demand-Response problem in electricity tarification.
Sannikov’s approach consists in deriving a representation of the dynamic value process, by
means of the dynamic programming principle, and then reformulating the principal objective
as a control problem on the coefficients of this representation. By this methodology, the initial
Stackelberg stochastic differential game is reduced to a stochastic control problem. Notice that
this representation is nothing but the non-Markovian version of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation corresponding to the agent problem. The extension to the controlled diffusion setting
follows the same idea but requires in addition a density result of second order backward SDEs.
The main objective of this paper is to extend the reduction result of [CPT18] to the random
horizon context. In particular, this allows to cover the seminal paper of Sannikov [San08]. The
random horizon setting is commonly used in applications in order to reduce the dimensionality of
control problems, as the time variable disappears in homogeneous formulations. Consequently,
if the controlled state is one-dimensional, the HJB partial differential equation reduces to a
nonlinear ordinary differential equation whose analysis is usually simpler, and which may be
found in explicit form in several cases.
We shall introduce two versions of the random horizon Principal-Agent problem. The first is
a direct extension of the finite horizon one, and is named as the European contracting problem.
The second one corresponds to the setting of [San08], and is named as the American contracting
problem due to the possibility offered to the agent and the principal to terminate the contract
at some chosen stopping time. In other words, both actors are faced with an optimal stopping
problem in addition to optimally controlling the coefficients of the controlled output process.
As in [CPT18], our main results, both for the European and the American contracting prob-
lems, rely on a density property of second order backward SDEs in an appropriate family of
solutions of the non-Markovian version of the agent HJB equation. The corresponding well-
posedness result is obtained in our accompanying paper [LRTY18]. However, while the density
argument for the European contracting follows the corresponding argument in [CPT18], the
American contracting argument requires a new justification based on understanding the princi-
pal choice of the optimal termination time of the contract, given the optimal stopping response
of the agent.
The paper is organized as follows. The random horizon Principal-Agent problem is de-
scribed in Section 2 both in its European and American formulations. Section 3 shows that our
European contracting problem does not coincide with the corresponding first best contracting
problem in the context where the discount factors of both actors are deterministic. This is in
contrast with the deterministic horizon situation. In Section 4, we state our main reduction
results, and we report their proof based on a density property of second order backward SDEs.
We illustrate the usefulness of our reduction result through a solvable example in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 contains the proof of the key density result.
2
Preliminaries and notations Given an integer d, and some initial condition X0 ∈ Rd, we
introduce the canonical space of continuous paths Ω :=
{
ω ∈ C(R+,Rd) : ω0 = X0}, equipped
with the distance defined by ‖ω − ω′‖∞ :=
∑
n≥0 2
−n( sup0≤t≤n |ωt − ω′t| ∧ 1). We denote by
M1+(Ω) the collection of all probability measures on Ω.
The canonical process X is defined by Xt(ω) := ωt, for all ω ∈ Ω, with corresponding
canonical filtration F = (Ft)t≥0. We also introduce the the right limit F+ = (F+t )t≥0 of F, and
for a measure P ∈ M1+(Ω), the augmentation F+,P of the filtration F+ under P. For a subset
P ⊆M1+(Ω), we introduce FP :=
(FPt )t≥0 and F+,P := (F+,Pt )t≥0, where
FPt :=
⋂
P∈P
FPt and F+,Pt :=
⋂
P∈P
F+,Pt .
We say that a property holds P−quasi-surely, abbreviated as P−q.s., if it holds P−a.s. for
all P ∈ P. The universal filtration FU := (FUt )t≥0 and the corresponding (right-continuous)
completion F+,U :=
(F+,Ut )t≥0 correspond to the case P = M1+(Ω).
We denote by Ploc ⊆ M1+(Ω) the collection of probability measures P such that X is a
continuous P-local martingale with quadratic variation process absolutely continuous in t, with
respect to the Lebesgue measure, with corresponding density
σ̂2t := lim sup
n→∞
n
(〈X,X〉t − 〈X,X〉(t− 1
n
)∨0
)
, t > 0.
Here, the quadratic covariation process 〈X〉 is pathwisely well-defined by Karandikar [Kar95].
Then, for all P ∈ Ploc, we may find a Brownian motion W such that
Xt =
∫ t
0
σ̂sdWs, t ≥ 0, P-a.s.
For a stopping time τ we define the stochastic interval J0, τK := {(t, ω) ∈ R+ × Ω : t ≤ τ(ω)}.
We next enlarge the canonical space to Ω := Ω × Ω and denote by (X,W ) the coordinate
process in Ω. Denote by F the filtration generated by (X,W ). For each P ∈ Ploc, we may
construct a probability measure P on Ω such that P ◦X−1 = P, W is a P-Brownian motion and
dXt = σ̂tdWt, P-a.s. From now on, we abuse the notation, and keep using P to represent P on
Ω. Denote by QL(P) the set of all probability measures Qλ such that
D
Qλ|P
t :=
dQλ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
(∫ t
0
λs · dWs − 1
2
∫ t
0
|λs|2ds
)
, t ≥ 0, (1.1)
for some F+,P-progressively measurable process λ = (λ)t≥0 uniformly bounded by L. By Gir-
sanov’s theorem, W λ := W − ∫ ·0 λsds is a Qλ-Brownian motion on any finite horizon, and thus
Xλ := X − ∫ ·0 σ̂tλtdt is a Qλ-martingale on any finite horizon. We denote
EP[·] := sup
Q∈QL(P)
EQ[·], for P ∈ Ploc, and EP [·] := sup
P∈P
EP[·], for a subset P ⊆ Ploc.
Let p > 1 and α ∈ R, and let τ be an F+,P-stopping time. Let G := {Gt}t≥0 be a filtration with
Gt ⊇ Ft for all t ≥ 0, so that τ is also a G-stopping time. We denote:
• Lpα,τ (P,G), the space of R-valued, Gτ -measurable R-valued random variables ξ, such that
‖ξ‖pLpα,τ (P) := E
P[∣∣eατ ξ∣∣p] <∞.
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• Dpα,τ (P,G), the space of scalar ca`dla`g G-adapted processes Y such that
‖Y ‖pDpα,τ := E
P
[
sup
0≤t≤τ
∣∣eαtYt∣∣p] <∞.
• Hpα,τ (P,G), the space of Rd-valued, F+-progressively measurable processes Z such that
‖Z‖pHpα,τ := E
P
[(∫ τ
0
∣∣eαtσ̂⊤t Zt∣∣2dt) p2
]
<∞.
2 Principal-agent problem
2.1 Controlled state equation
The agent’s effort ν = (α, β) is an F-optional process with values in A×B for some subsets A
and B of finite dimensional spaces. We denote the set of such effort processes as U. The output
process takes values in Rd, with distribution defined by means of the controlled coefficients:
λ : R+ × Ω×A −→ Rd, bounded, λ(·, a) F-optional for any a ∈ A,
σ : R+ × Ω×B −→Md(R), bounded, σ(·, b) F-optional for any b ∈ B,
where Md(R) denotes the space of all square d × d matrices with real entries. The controlled
state equation is defined by the stochastic differential equation (SDE):
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X,βr)
(
λr(X,αr)dr + dWr
)
, t ≥ 0, (2.1)
where W is a d-dimensional Brownian motion. Notice that the processes α and β are functions
of the path of X. As it is standard in probability theory, the dependence on the canonical
process will be suppressed.
A control model is a weak solution of (2.1) defined as a pair M := (P, ν) ∈M1+(Ω)× U. We
denoteM the collection of all such control models, as opposed to control processes. We assume
throughout this paper the following implicit condition on σ, see Remark 2.1 below,
M 6= ∅. (2.2)
This condition is satisfied for instance if x 7→ σt(x, b) is bounded and continuous for some
constant control b ∈ B, see e.g. [KS91, Theorem 5.4.22, Remark 5.4.23].
Notice that we do not restrict the controls to those for which weak uniqueness holds. More-
over, by Girsanov’s theorem, two weak solutions of (2.1) associated with (α, β) and (α′, β) are
equivalent. However, different diffusion coefficients induce mutually singular weak solutions of
the corresponding stochastic differential equations.
We finally introduce the following sets:
P(ν) := {P ∈M1+(Ω), (P, ν) ∈M}, P := ∪ν∈UP(ν),
U(P) := {ν ∈ U, (P, ν) ∈ M}, U := ∪P∈M1+(Ω)U(P).
Remark 2.1. By the boundedness of λ, we may connect any admissible model (P, ν) ∈ M to
a subset of Pb as follows. Let (Q, β) be an arbitrary weak solution of the driftless SDE
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σr(X,βr)dWr, t ≥ 0, (2.3)
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for some optional B-valued process β. Then, Q ∈ Ploc, and we may use the Girsanov change
of measure theorem to define for all A-valued optional process α a pair M :=
(
P, (α, β)
)
which
solves the SDE (2.1), by setting dP
dQ
∣∣
Ft = exp
( ∫ t
0 λs(X,αs)·dWs − 12
∫ t
0 |λs(X,αs)|2ds
)
, t ≥ 0.
Conversely, any admissible model M =
(
P, (α, β)
) ∈ M induces a probability measure
Q ∈ Ploc by the last Girsanov equivalent change of measure.
2.2 Agent’s problem
The effort exerted by the agent is costly, with cost of effort measured by the function
c : R+ × Ω×A×B → R+, measurable, c(·, u) F-optional for all u ∈ A×B, and c(., 0) = 0.
Let (P, ν) ∈ M be fixed. The canonical process X is called the output process, and the control
ν is called the agent’s effort or action. The agent exerts the effort process ν to control the
(distribution of the) output process defined by the state equation (2.1), while subject to cost
of effort at rate c(X, ν). The agent values future income through the discount factor Kν :=
e−
∫ .
0
kr(νr)dr, where
k : R+ × Ω×A×B → R, bounded, with k(·, u) F− optional for all u ∈ A×B,
and k(., 0) = k0, for some constant k0 > 0.
A contract is a triple C = (τP, π, ξ) composed of
• a finite stopping time τP, representing the termination time of the contract,
• an optional process (πt∧τP)t≥0, representing a rate of payment from the principal to the
agent, and
• an FτP -measurable random variable ξ, representing the final compensation at retirement.
The principal observes only the output process X, and has no access to the information on
the agent’s effort. Consequently, the components of the contract C can only be contingent on
X, which is immediately encoded in our weak formulation setting.
The set of admissible contracts C consists of all such contracts which satisfy in addition the
technical requirements reported in Subsection 2.4 below.
The agent’s preferences are defined by a continuous strictly increasing utility function U :
R→ R. Given a contract C = (τP, π, ξ), we shall consider in this paper two possible contracting
problems which are both relevant in the economics literature.
Agent cannot quit: we first consider the contract problem as in Sannikov [San08]. By analogy
with derivatives securities, we refer to this setting as that of an European contracting problem.
The objective function is defined by
JE(M,C) := EP
[
KντPU(ξ) +
∫ τP
0
Kνt
(
U(πt)− ct(νt)
)
dt
]
, for all M = (P, ν) ∈ M. (2.4)
Throughout the paper, we adopt the convention ∞ − ∞ = −∞, implying that the above
expectation JE(M,C) is well-defined. The European agent aims at optimally choosing the
effort, given the promised compensation contract C:
V E(C) := sup
M∈M
JE(M,C), C ∈ C,
5
with the convention sup ∅ = −∞, which also prevails throughout the paper.
A control model M̂ = (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M is an optimal response to contract C if V E(C) = JE(M̂,C).
We denote by M̂E(C) the (possibly empty) set of all such optimal control models.
Agent can quit: we now introduce a new setting which we name as that of the American
contracting problem. We assume that the agent may chose a retirement time τ before the
contract terminates. After retirement, the agent receives no more transfers from the principal,
i.e. ξ = 0 and π = 0 on {t ≥ τ ∧ τP}. As ct(0) = 0 and kt(0) = k0, the (dynamic) value function
of the agent at retirement is given by∫ ∞
τ∧τP
e−k0(t−τ∧τ
P)U(0)dt =
U(0)
k0
=: U(ρ).
Given this definition of the constant ρ, we denote by CA the collection of all pairs CA = (τP, π)
such that C := (CA, ρ) ∈ C. We denote byMA the collection of all decision variables (τ,M) for
the agent, where τ is an F-stopping time, and M = (P, ν) ∈M. The American agent’s objective
function is defined by
JA(τ,M,CA) := EP
[
Kντ∧τPU(ρ) +
∫ τ∧τP
0
Kνt
(
U(πt)− ct(νt)
)
dt
]
, for all (τ,M) ∈MA,
and aims at optimally choosing the effort and the quitting time, given the promised compensa-
tion contract CA:
V A
(
CA
)
:= sup
(τ,M)∈MA
JA
(
τ,M,CA
)
, CA ∈ CA. (2.5)
We say that
(
τ̂ , M̂
) ∈ MA is an optimal response to contract CA if V A(CA) = JA(τ̂ , M̂,CA).
We denote by M̂A(CA) the (possibly empty) set of all such optimal responses.
2.3 Principal’s problem
The contracts which can be offered by the principal are those admissible contracts which are
subject to the additional restriction:
C
a
R :=
{
C ∈ Ca : V a(C) ≥ U(R)}, a ∈ {E,A}, (2.6)
where CE := C, and R is a given participation threshold representing the minimum satisfaction
level required by the agent in order to accept the contract.
The principal benefits from the value of the output X and pays the agent as promised in
the contract C, namely, she pays a continuous compensation at the rate π, and
• in case of a European contract, a final compensation ξ at the termination time τP,
• in case of an American agent, ξ = 0 at the agent quitting time τ̂ ∧ τP.
This leads to the following definitions for the second-best principal’s problem under European
and American contracts, respectively:
V PE := sup
C∈CE
R
sup
M∈M̂E(C)
JP(M,C), and V PA := sup
(τP,π)∈CA
R
sup
(τ,M)∈M̂A(τP,π)
JP(M, τ ∧ τP, π, 0),
where, for all C = (τ, π, ξ):
JP(M,C) := EP
[
KPτ UP
(
ℓτ − ξ
)
+
∫ τ
0
KPr UP(−πr)dr
]
.
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Here, UP : R → R is a given nondecreasing utility function, ℓ : Ω→ R is a liquidation function
with linear growth, ℓτ := ℓ(X.∧τ ), and KPt := e−
∫ t
0
kPr dr, t ≥ 0, is a discount factor, defined by
means of a discount rate function
kP : R+ × Ω→ R, bounded and F-optional.
By our convention sup ∅ = −∞, notice that the principal only offers those admissible contracts
which induce a non-empty set of optimal responses, i.e. M̂E(C) 6= ∅ in the European case and
M̂A(τP, π) 6= ∅ in the American case. We also observe that, following the standard economic
convention, the above definition of the principal’s criterion assumes that, in the case where the
agent is indifferent between various optimal responses, he implements the one that is the best
for the principal.
2.4 Admissible contracts
We now provide the precise definition of the set of admissible contracts C. We need the following
additional notations:
Ωωt :=
{
ω′ ∈ Ω : ω|[0,t] = ω′|[0,t]
}
, (ω ⊗t ω′)s := 1{s≤t}ωs + 1{s>t}(ωt + ω′s−t),
and
ξt,ω(ω′) := ξ(ω ⊗t ω′), Xt,ωs (ω′) := Xt+s(ω ⊗t ω′), ~τ t,ω := τ t,ω − t.
We also introduce the dynamic version of P by considering the controlled SDE on [t,∞) issued
from the path ω ∈ Ω
P(t, ω) :=
{
P ∈M1+(Ωωt ) : dXt,ωs = σt,ωs (Xt,ω , βs)
(
λt,ωs (X
t,ω, αs)ds+ dWs
)
,P-a.s., (α, β) ∈ U
}
.
In particular P = P(0,0). We shall use the nonlinear expectations EP(t,ω)[·] := supP∈P(t,ω) EP[·].
Definition 2.2. (i) We denote by τ ∈ T the collection of all stopping times τ satisfying
lim
n→∞ E
P[1{τ≥n}] = 0. (2.7)
(ii) An admissible contract is a triple C = (τ, π, ξ), with τ ∈ T , and
EP(t,ω)[∣∣eρ~τ t,ωU(ξt,ω)∣∣q]+ EP(t,ω)[(∫ ~τ t,ω
0
∣∣eρrU(πt,ωr )∣∣2dr) q2] <∞, (2.8)
for some q > 1 and ρ > −µ, where
µ = inf
u∈A×B
inf
t≥0
ess inf
ω∈Ω
kt(ω, u).
We denote by C the set of admissible contracts.
The following condition ensures that JE and JA are finite for all contract C ∈ C.
Assumption 2.3. The cost function c is bounded by c satisfying, for some ρ > −µ and q > 1,
EP(t,ω)
[(∫ ~τ t,ω
0
∣∣eρr ct,ωr ∣∣2dr) q2 ] <∞, for all (t, ω) ∈ J0, τK, and τ ∈ T . (2.9)
Remark 2.4. For (t, ω) = (0,0), we have P(t, ω) = P and
EP
[(∫ τ
0
∣∣eρrcr∣∣2dr) q2]+ EP[|eρτU(ξ)|q]+ EP[(∫ τ
0
|eρrU(πr)|2dr
) q
2
]
<∞.
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3 Comparison with first best contracts
In the economics literature, it is well-known that in the risk-neutral agent setting with deter-
ministic maturity T , the European Principal-Agent problem reduces to one single optimization
problem corresponding to the case where the principal imposes the amount of effort that the
agent devotes. This is the so-called first-best optimal contract problem where the principal has
full power to choose both the contract and the agent effort. Under the European contracting
rule, the first best risk sharing problem is defined by
V PEfb := sup
(C,M)∈C×M
JA(M,C)≥R
EP
[
KPτ UP
(
ℓτ − ξ
)
+
∫ τ
0
KPt UP(−πt)dt
]
. (3.1)
It is clear that V PEfb ≥ V PE. In this section, we provide precise conditions under which equality
holds. We first need to assume that the agent’s discount rate k is independent of the effort, so
that the agent discount factor is independent of the effort process:
Kt := Kνt is independent of ν, and we denote ηt :=
Kt
KPt
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.2)
This condition is necessary in order to identify directly the optimal first best compensations
(ξ, π) of the principal independently of the agent’s effort.
We also assume that the principal’s utility function
UP is C
1, increasing, and strictly concave, with U ′P(−∞) =∞, U ′P(∞) = 0, (3.3)
and we introduce the corresponding convex conjugate
U∗P(y) := sup
x∈R
{UP(x)− xy} = UP ◦ (U ′P)−1(y)− y(U ′P)−1(y).
Finally, we shall denote for any function F : R+ −→ R with appropriate measurability:
JFτ (λ) := KPτ F (λητ ) +
∫ τ
0
KPt F (ληt)dt, λ ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a risk neutral agent, i.e. U = IdR, and let Conditions (3.2)-(3.3)
hold true. For λ ≥ 0, define ξλ := ℓτ − (U ′P)−1(λητ ), πλ := −(U ′P)−1(λη), and assume
(C1) there is a solution (τλ,Mλ) for the problem
vfb(λ) := sup
τ∈T
M∈M(τ,πλ,ξλ)
EP
[
J
U∗
P
τ (λ) + λHτ (ν)
]
, with Hτ (ν) := Kτ ℓτ −
∫ τ
0
Ktct(νt)dt−R;
(C2) there exists λ̂ > 0 satisfying the equation
0 = EP
λ̂
[
J
U∗
P
τ λ̂
(
λ̂
)− JUP◦(U ′P)−1
τ λ̂
(
λ̂
)
+ λ̂H
τ λ̂
(
ν λ̂
)]
.
Then,
(i) V PEfb = vfb
(
λ̂
)
, with optimal contract and effort
Ĉ :=
(
τ̂P, π̂, ξ̂
)
:=
(
τ λ̂, πλ̂, ξλ̂
)
and M̂ := Mλ̂ =
(
Pλ̂, ν λ̂
)
.
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(ii) V PE = V PEfb if and only if M̂ is also a solution of the problem
v̂ := sup
M∈M(Ĉ)
EP
[
J
U∗
P
−UP◦(U ′P)−1
τ λ̂
(λ̂) + λ̂H
τ λ̂
(ν)
]
,
and in this case
(
τ̂P, π̂, ξ̂
)
is also a second best optimal contract and M̂ optimal effort
model.
(iii) Let τP = T be some fixed deterministic maturity, and K,KP be deterministic functions.
Then, Condition (C2) is satisfied, and the problems vfb and v̂ have the same set of solu-
tions. Consequently, V PE = V PEfb , and the first best and second best optimal contracting
problems have the same solution.
Proof. (i) Let C = (τ, π, ξ) and M = (P, ν) satisfy the participation constraint JA(M,C) ≥ R.
As the parameter λ̂ defined in Condition (C2) is nonnegative, we have,
JP(M,C) ≤ EP
[
KPτ UP(ℓτ − ξ) +
∫ τ
0
KPt UP(−πt)dt
+ λ̂
(
Kτξ +
∫ τ
0
Kt
(
πt − ct(νt)
)
dt−R
)]
(3.4)
= EP
[
KPτ
{
UP(ℓτ − ξ)− λ̂ητ (ℓτ − ξ)
}
+
∫ τ
0
KPt
{
UP(−πt)− λ̂ηt(−πt)
}
dt
+ λ̂
(
Kτ ℓτ −
∫ τ
0
Ktct(νt)dt−R
)]
≤ EP
[
KPτ U∗
(
λ̂ητ
)
+
∫ τ
0
KPt U∗
(
λ̂ηt
)
dt+ λ̂Hτ (ν)
]
(3.5)
= EP
[
JU
∗
τ
(
λ̂
)
+ λ̂Hτ (ν)
]
≤ vfb
(
λ̂
)
. (3.6)
By the arbitrariness of (τ, π, ξ,M), this implies that vfb
(
λ̂
)
defines an upper bound for V PEfb .
Clearly, the contract Ĉ =
(
τ̂P, π̂, ξ̂
)
with effort M̂, whose existence is guaranteed by Condition
(C1), restores the equality both in (3.5) and in (3.6). By direct verification, we also see that the
choice of λ by means of Condition (C2) restores equality in (3.4). Hence, the last upper bound
is achieved, and therefore
(
τ̂P, π̂, ξ̂, M̂
)
is a solution of the first best problem.
(ii) The inequality V PEfb ≥ V PE is obvious. In order for equality to equality, a necessary and
sufficient condition is that the optimal agent response M̂Ĉ = M̂, i.e. the agent’s optimal response
to the first best optimal contract coincides with the first best optimal effort.
In order to complete the proof, we now show that given the contract
(
τ̂P, π̂, ξ̂
)
, the effort
M̂ =
(
P̂, ν̂
)
is an optimal response for the Agent problem. Indeed, we directly compute that
JE
(
M, Ĉ
)
= EP
[
Kτ̂P ξ̂ +
∫ τ̂P
0
Kt
(
π̂t − ct(νt)
)
dt
]
= EP
[
Kτ̂P
{
ℓτ̂ − (U ′P)−1
(
λ̂ητ̂
)}
+
∫ τ̂P
0
Kt
{− (U ′P)−1(λ̂ηt)− ct(νt)}dt
]
= R+
1
λ̂
EP
[
λ̂
(
Kτ̂Pℓτ̂P −
∫ τ̂P
0
Ktct(νt)dt−R
)
−KPτ̂P λ̂ητ̂P(U ′P)−1(λ̂ητ̂P)
−
∫ τ̂P
0
KPt λ̂ηt(U ′P)−1
(
λ̂ηt
)
dt
]
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= R+
1
λ̂
EP
[
λ̂Hτ̂P(ν) + J
U∗
P
−UP◦(U ′P)−1
τ̂P
(
λ̂
)] ≤ R+ v̂
λ̂
,
where we used the fact that U∗(y) = U ◦ (U ′)−1(y) − y(U ′)−1(y). By the arbitrariness of
M ∈ M(Ĉ) this provides the upper bound V E(Ĉ) ≤ R+ v̂
λ̂
, which is achieved by the maximizer
of v̂. Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for the equality between the first best and
the second best contracting problems is that the optimal first best effort M̂ is also a maximizer
of v̂.
(iii) In the present setting, notice that JU
∗
T (λ) and J
U◦(U ′)−1
T (λ) are deterministic. Then,
vfb(λ) = J
U∗P
T (λ) + λ sup
M∈M(T,πλ,ξλ)
EP
[
HT (ν)
]
Similarly, we have
v̂ = J
U∗
P
−UP◦(U ′P)−1
T (λ̂) + λ̂ sup
M∈M(Ĉ)
EP
[
HT (ν)
]
,
which reduces to the same maximization problem as in vfb(λ̂). Let us finally check that
Condition (C2) is verified. Indeed, notice that in the present case, the optimal controls
(τ̂ , M̂) = (τλ,Mλ) are independent of λ. The Condition (C2) reduces to
0 = EP̂
[
J
U∗P
T (λ̂)− J
UP◦(U ′P)−1
T (λ̂) + λ̂HT (ν̂)
]
= V PEfb − JUP◦(U
′
P)
−1
T (λ̂).
Hence, the existence of a unique solution to the last equation follows from our condition (3.3)
on the principal’s utility function.
4 Reduction to a standard stochastic control problem
In this section, we extend the result of Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı and Touzi [CPT18] to the present
random horizon setting. The key argument, introduced by Sannikov [San08], is to reduce the
principal optimization problem by using the dynamic programming representation of the agent’s
value process. As is standard in stochastic control theory, such a representation involves the
agent’s (path-dependent) Hamiltonian:
Ht(ω, y, z, γ) := sup
u∈A×B
ht(ω, y, z, γ, u); (t, ω) ∈ [0,∞)× Ω, (y, z, γ) ∈ R× Rd × Sd(R), (4.1)
where Sd(R) is the set of symmetric matrices in Md(R), and for u = (a, b) ∈ A×B
ht(ω, y, z, γ, u) := −ct(ω, u)− kt(ω, u)y + σt(ω, b)λt(ω, a) · z + 1
2
Tr
[
(σtσ
⊤
t )(ω, b)γ
]
, (4.2)
where Tr[M ] denotes the trace of a matrix M ∈ Md(R).
We next introduce for an arbitrary initial value Y0 ∈ R, and F-predictable processes (Z,Γ)
with values in Rd × Sd(R), the process Y Y0,Z,Γ defined by the random ODE:
Y
Y0,Z,Γ
t := Y0 +
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr + 1
2
Tr
[
Γrd〈X〉r
]−Hr(Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr)dr − U(πr)dr, (4.3)
under appropriate integrability. We shall see that the process Y Y0,Z,Γ turns out to represent the
agent’s value process, and will be shown to be a convenient parameterization of the contracts
by setting (τ, π, ξ) = (τ, π, ξY0,Z,Γ) with ξY0,Z,Γ := U−1
(
Y
Y0,Z,Γ
τ
)
.
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Definition 4.1. We denote by V the collection of all such processes (Z,Γ) satisfying in addition:
(i) ‖Z‖Hp
α,τP
(P) + ‖Y Y0,Z,Γ‖Dp
α,τP
(P) <∞, for some p > 1 and α ∈ R.
(ii) There exists a weak solution
(
PY0,Z,Γ, νY0,Z,Γ
) ∈ M such that
Ht(Yt, Zt,Γt) = ht
(
Yt, Zt,Γt, ν
Y0,Z,Γ
t
)
, dt⊗ PY0,Z,Γ-a.e. on J0, τPK. (4.4)
Condition (i) guarantees that the process Y Y0,Z,Γ of (4.3) is well-defined P-a.s. for all P ∈ P.
First, as k is bounded, the Hamiltonian H is Lipschitz in the y variable. It guarantees that
Y Y0,Z,Γ is well-defined as the unique solution of the ODE with random coefficients (4.3), provided
that the integrals are well-defined. Moreover, as in [CPT18], the integrals are indeed well-
defined, without further condition on the process Γ, as we see by applying Itoˆ’s formula that
Kνt Y Y0,Z,Γt +
∫ t
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cr(νr)
)
dr = Y0 +
∫ t
0
KνrZr · σr(βr)dW Pr −Aνt , t ≤ τ, P-a.s., (4.5)
for all (P, ν) ∈ M, where Aν := ∫ .0 Kνr [Hr − hr(., νr)](Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr)dr is a nondecreasing
process. Due to Assumption 2.3 and the admissibility condition (2.8), the first integral is well-
defined. Now, the only issue is with the existence of the stochastic integral
∫ .
0KνrZr ·σr(βr)dW Pr
under each P ∈ P. We emphasize that, as a consequence of the main result of Nutz [Nut12],
the stochastic integral
∫ .
0KνrZr · dXr is defined pathwisely on Ω without exclusion of any null
set. This is a crucial fact as our main result below states that the principal’s problem can
be reduced to choosing among contracts of the form
(
τP, π, U−1(Y Y0,Z,Γ
τP
)
)
, which requires that
such contracts be independent from the agent’s control model.
Condition (ii) states the existence of a maximizer of the hamiltonian H, defined in (4.1),
that induces an admissible control model for the agent’s problem. The existence of a maximizer
is a standard condition in the verification argument in stochastic control theory, which allows to
identify the optimal control. As in [CPT18], we shall see that, given C =
(
τP, π, U−1(Y Y0,Z,Γτ )
)
,
the process Y Y0,Z,Γ is the dynamic value function of the agent’s control problem, and is precisely
expressed in the required Itoˆ decomposition form (4.3). In particular, Y0 = V
E(C). As the
principal problem restricts to those admissible contracts which induce existence for the agent’s
problem M̂E(C) 6= ∅, condition (ii) is necessary to characterize the agent’s optimal response
which needs to be plugged in the principal’s problem V PE. A similar discussion applies to the
American Principal-Agent problem.
By Condition (ii) together with the continuity of h, we deduce from a classical measurable
selection argument, see e.g. [Ben70, Ben71], the existence of measurable maps ût(ω, y, z, γ) :=
(α̂, β̂)t(ω, y, z, γ) which maximize H
Ht(ω, y, z, γ) = ht
(
ω, y, z, γ, ût(ω, y, z, γ)
)
.
We next denote by Û the collection of all such measurable maximizers, and we introduce the
optimal feedback controls
ν̂
Y0,Z,Γ
t := ût
(
X,Y
Y0,Z,Γ
t , Zt,Γt
)
,
which induce the following coefficients for the optimal output process
λ̂t(ω, y, z, γ) := λt
(
ω, α̂t(ω, y, z, γ)
)
, σ̂t(ω, y, z, γ) := σt
(
ω, β̂t(ω, y, z, γ)
)
.
By Condition (ii) of Definition 4.1, it follows that for all (Z,Γ) ∈ V and any û ∈ Û , the following
stochastic differential equation driven by a d-dimensional Brownian motion W
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
σ̂r(X,Y
Y0,Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr)
(
λ̂r(X,Y
Y0,Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr)dr + dWr
)
, t ≤ τ, (4.6)
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has at least one weak solution M̂Y0,Z,Γ = (P̂Y0,Z,Γ, ν̂Y0,Z,Γ). Our main result is the following
extension of Cvitanic´, Possama¨ı, and Touzi [CPT18] reduction result to the present random
horizon context. Recall the notation ξY0,Z,Γ := U−1(Y Y0,Z,Γτ ) for (Y0, Z,Γ) ranging in R× V.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that V 6= ∅. Then,
(i) V PE = supY0≥R V
PE(Y0), where
V PE(Y0) := sup
(τP,π)∈T ×Π
(Z,Γ)∈V
sup
(P,ν)∈M̂E
(
τP,π,ξY0,Z,Γ
)EP[KPτPUP(ℓτP− ξY0,Z,Γ)+∫ τP
0
KPr UP(−πr)dr
]
.
Moreover, if (Y ∗0 , Z
∗,Γ∗, τ∗, π∗) is a solution of the last optimal control problem, then the
triple (τ∗, π∗, ξY ∗0 ,Z∗,Γ∗) is an optimal contract for the European Principal-Agent problem.
(ii) V PA = supY0≥R V
PA(Y0), where, denoting h0 := h
Y0,Z,Γ
0 := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : Y Y0,Z,Γt ≤ U(ρ)
}
,
V PA(Y0) := sup
π∈Π
(Z,Γ)∈V
sup
(P,ν)∈M̂A(h0,π)
EP
[
KP
h0
UP
(
ℓh0
)
+
∫
h0
0
KPr UP(−πr)dr
]
.
Moreover, if (Y ∗0 , Z
∗,Γ∗, π∗) is a solution of the last optimal control problem, then denoting
τ∗ := hY
∗
0 ,Z
∗,Γ∗
0 , the pair (τ
∗, π∗) is an optimal contract for the American Principal-Agent
problem.
The key argument for this reduction result is the following density property of the class of
contracts C = (τ, π, ξY0,Z,Γ).
Proposition 4.3. Let C = (τ, π, ξ) ∈ CER. Then, we may find Y ε0 ≥ R and (Zε,Γε) ∈ V such
that, with ξε := U−1
(
Y
Y ε0 ,Z
ε,Γε
τ
)
, we have
Cε := (τ, π, ξε) ∈ CER, M̂E(Cε) = M̂E(C), and ξε = ξ, P-a.s., for all (P, ν) ∈ M̂E(C).
We postpone the proof of this result to the next section, and we use it now for the proof of
Theorem 4.2 (i) and (ii).
Proof of Theorem 4.2 (i). We organize the proof in two steps. We first establish inequality
V PE ≥ V PE(Y0) by following the classical verification argument in stochastic control theory,
and we next prove equality by using the density result of Proposition 4.3.
Step 1. We first show that V PE ≥ V PE(Y0), for all Y0 ∈ R. Let (Z,Γ) ∈ V, and fix some
stopping time τP, and optional process π satisfying the integrability condition in (2.8). The
required inequality is a direct consequence of the following two steps.
1.a. We first verify that CY0,Z,Γ =
(
τP, π, ξY0,Z,Γ
) ∈ C, (PY0,Z,Γ, νY0,Z,Γ) ∈ M̂E(CY0,Z,Γ) and
Y0 = V
E
(
CY0,Z,Γ
)
. From the definition of Y Y0,Z,Γ
τP
in (4.3), it is clear that ξY0,Z,Γ is an FτP-
measurable random variable. The integrability of Y Y0,Z,Γ
τP
= U(ξY0,Z,Γ) follows from Definition
4.1 (i).
For any M = (P, ν) ∈ M, it follows from a direct application of Itoˆ’s formula that
KντPY Y0,Z,ΓτP = Y0 +
∫ τP
0
KνrZr · σβrr dW Pr −
∫ τP
0
KνrHr
(
Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr
)
dr −
∫ τP
0
KνrU(πr)dr
+
∫ τP
0
Kνr
(
− kνrr Y Y0,Z,Γr + Zr · σβrr λαrr +
1
2
Tr
[
σ̂2rΓr
])
dr,
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where we used the simplifying notation ϕur := ϕr(x, u) for ϕ = k, σ, λ. As (Z,Γ) ∈ V0, the
stochastic integral
∫ ·
0 KνrZr · σβrr dW Pr defines a martingale. By the definition of the agent’s
optimization criterion JE and the definition of h, we may write the last equation as
JE
(
M,CY0,Z,Γ
)
= EP
[
KντPU
(
ξ
Y0,Z,Γ
τP
)
+
∫ τP
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cr(νr)
)
dr
]
= Y0 − EP
[∫ τP
0
Kνr
(
Hr
(
Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr
)− hr(Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr, νr))dr
]
. (4.7)
It follows by the definition of H that JE
(
M,CY0,Z,Γ
) ≤ Y0, and thus V E(CY0,Z,Γ) ≤ Y0 by the
arbitrariness of M ∈ M. Finally, the equality JE(PY0,Z,Γ, νY0,Z,Γ,CY0,Z,Γ) = Y0 holds in (4.7)
with the control (PY0,Z,Γ, νY0,Z,Γ) introduced in the admissibility condition (ii) of Definition 4.1.
This shows that (PY0,Z,Γ, νY0,Z,Γ) ∈ M̂E(CY0,Z,Γ) 6= ∅, and therefore CY0,Z,Γ ∈ C.
1.b. We next show (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(CY0,Z,Γ) if and only if Ht(Yt, Zt,Γt) = ht(Yt, Zt,Γt, ν̂t), dt⊗ P̂-
a.e. on J0, τPK, i.e., the control process ν̂ is a maximizer of the Hamiltonian on the support of P̂.
It follows from (4.7) and the equality V E
(
CY0,Z,Γ
)
= Y0, established in Step 1.a, that we must
have for all (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(CY0,Z,Γ) that
EP̂
[∫ τP
0
Kν̂r
(
Hr
(
Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr
)− hr(Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr, ν̂r))dr
]
= 0.
By the definition of H in (4.1), this holds if and only if ν̂ is a maximizer of Hr
(
Y
Y0,Z,Γ
r , Zr,Γr
)
,
dt⊗ P̂-a.e. on J0, τPK.
To summarize: for (τP, π) ∈ T × Π, Y0 ≥ R and (Z,Γ) ∈ V, we have that CY0,Z,Γ =
(τP, π, ξY0,Z,Γ) ∈ C, i.e., CY0,Z,Γ is an admissible contract, and M̂E(CY0,Z,Γ) 6= ∅ as well as
V E(CY0,Z,Γ) = Y0. Therefore, it follows immediately that V
PE ≥ supY0≥R V PE(Y0).
Step 2. By Proposition 4.3, for any C = (τP, π, ξ) ∈ CER with M̂E 6= ∅, we may define
a contract Cε = (τP, π, ξε) ∈ CER, where ξε = U−1
(
Y
Y ε0 ,Z
ε,Γε
τP
)
for some (Zε,Γε) ∈ V, such
that M̂E(Cε) = M̂E(C) and ξε = ξ, P̂-a.s. for all (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(C). Therefore, for each
(P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(C) = M̂E(Cε) we obtain that
JP(Cε) = sup
(P̂,ν̂)∈M̂E(Cε)
EP̂
[
KPτPUP(ℓτP − ξε) +
∫ τP
0
KPr UP(−πr)dr
]
= sup
(P̂,ν̂)∈M̂E(C)
EP̂
[
KPτPUP(ℓτP − ξ) +
∫ τP
0
KPr UP(−πr)dr
]
= JP(C).
By Step 1, notice that, the agent’s problem with the contract Cε can be explicitly solved and
we obtain V A(Cε) = Y ε0 . By arbitrariness of C, we obtain that V
PE ≤ supY0≥R V PE(Y0).
In order to obtain a similar reduction result for the American Principal-Agent problem, we
follow Sannikov’s [San08] idea by proceeding to a first reduction of the principal problem which
allows to transform the corresponding Agent problem into that of a European contract as no
early exercise is optimal for him.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 (ii). Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2 (i), we proceed in three steps,
following the classical verification argument in stochastic control theory.
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Step 1. We first prove that V PA ≥ supY0≥R V PA(Y0). Let Y0 ≥ R, (Z,Γ) ∈ V, π ∈ Π, and
h0 := h
Y0,Z,Γ
0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Y Y0,Z,Γ ≤ U(ρ)} ∈ [0,∞] be as defined in the statement of the
theorem, and consider the principal contract C := (h0, π, ρ). For M ∈ M and τ ≤ h0 we have
JA
(
τ,M,C
)
= EP
[
KντU(ρ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cr(νr)
)
dr
]
≤ EP
[
KντY Y0,Z,Γτ +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cr(νr)
)
dr
]
= Y0 − EP
[∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
Hr − hr(., νr)
)(
Y Y0,Z,Γr , Zr,Γr
)
dr
]
≤ Y0.
The last inequality is due to the definition of H. Moreover, as τ ≤ h0, it is clear that the only
way to turn both inequalities above into equalities is to take
MY0,Z,Γ =
(
PY0,Z,Γ, νY0,Z,Γ
)
and τ̂ = h0, P
Y0,Z,Γ-a.s., (4.8)
where we use the notations of Definition 4.1, together with the condition that the set V is
non-empty. Therefore V A(C) = Y0 with optimal American agent response given by the pair(
h0,M
Y0,Z,Γ
)
. By the same argument as in Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 4.2 (i), this provides
the inequality V PA ≥ supY0≥R V PA(Y0).
Step 2. In order to prove that equality holds, we introduce the dynamic version of the Amer-
ican agent problem for an arbitrary CA = (τP, π):
V At (C
A) := ess sup
τ≥t,M∈M
EPt
[
Kνt,τ∧τPU(ρ) +
∫ τ∧τp
t
Kνt,s
(
U(πs)− cs(νs)
)
ds
]
,
where Kνt,s := (Kνt )−1Kνs . Then define
τ̂ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : V At ≤ U(ρ)
}
, where V
A
t = lim
s↓t,s∈Q
V As . (4.9)
Note that τ̂ ≤ τP. We claim and shall prove in Step 3 that τ̂ is an optimal stopping time for
the agent, i.e.
V A0 (C
A) = sup
M∈M
EP
[
Kντ̂U(ρ) +
∫ τ̂
0
Kνs
(
U(πs)− cs(νs)
)
ds
]
. (4.10)
Therefore, we may reduce the principal to offer contracts of the form CA = (τ̂ , π), as her utility
criterion is not changed by fixing τP := τ̂ , and the agent’s problem reduces to
V A
(
CA
)
= sup
M∈M
JA
(
τ̂ ,M,CA
)
= sup
M∈M
JE
(
M,C
)
, with C :=
(
CA, ρ
)
.
We have thus transformed the American agent problem into a stochastic control problem
(without optimal stopping) as in the European agent context of Theorem 4.2 (i), and we may
now continue by adapting the same argument as in Step 2 of the proof of Theorem 4.2 (i).
Namely, Proposition 4.3 guarantees the existence of a contract Cε = (τ̂ , π, ξε) ∈ CR, where
ξε = U−1
(
Y
Y ε0 ,Z
ε,Γε
τ
)
for some (Zε,Γε) ∈ V, such that M̂E(Cε) = M̂E(C) and ξε = ρ, P̂-a.s. for
all (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(C). Next, define the new contract Cε := (τ̂ ε, π, ρ) where τ̂ ε := τ̂ ∧ inf{t ≥
0 : Y εt ≤ U(ρ)}, and we observe that for all (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(C) = M̂E(Cε), we have τ̂ ε = τ̂ ,
P̂-a.s., which is exactly the condition (4.8) required for the verification argument in Step 1 of
the present proof.
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We continue the proof by following exactly the same line of argument as in Step 2 of the
proof Theorem 4.2 (i), and we obtain the required equality.
Step 3. Here we are going to complete the proof by showing τ̂ in (4.9) is the optimal stopping
time for the agent. First, by the definition of V A, we have for any t′ ≥ t
V At (C
A) ≥ EPt
[Kνt,t′V At′ (CA)] .
Therefore, Kν0,tV At is a P-supermartingale for all (P, ν) ∈ M. Then, it is a classical result (see
e.g. [KS91, Proposition 1.3.14]) that the right limit of the process V A exists P-a.s. for all P ∈ P.
In particular, the process V
A
defined in (4.9) is right-continuous P-a.s. for all P ∈ P, and thus
τ̂ is a stopping time. Further, let
(
P̂, ν̂
)
be an optimal control, and thus
V At (C
A) = ess sup
τ≥t
EP̂t
[
Kν̂t,τ∧τPU(ρ) +
∫ τ∧τp
t
Kν̂t,s
(
U(πs)− cs(ν̂s)
)
ds
]
.
It follows the standard result of optimal stopping that the optimal stopping time is equal to τ̂ ,
P̂-a.s. Therefore, we obtain (4.10).
5 Solvable examples
5.1 An explicit European optimal contracting problem
This section illustrates the use of our main result in the context of the European contract-
ing problem. In order to gain in simplicity and to favor as most explicit results as possible,
the following example intentionally violates the technical conditions of the general contracting
problem. We shall point out how our main results extend to the present context.
Suppose that the contract has no continuous payment component, and that the agent is
solving the simple problem (with τ := τP):
sup
α
EP
α
[
ξ − 1
2
∫ τ
0
α2t dt
]
,
where α is any progressively measurable process which guarantees the existence of a weak
solution Pα for the following SDE
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
αsds+ dW
α
s , 0 ≤ t ≤ τ, Pα-a.s.
Clearly, this requires that EP
0[
D
Pα|P0
T
]
= 1, so that existence follows from the Girsanov theorem.
In the present context, we observe that we also have uniqueness of such a weak solution.
The Hamiltonian is given by
H(y, z, γ) =
1
2
Tr[γ] +H0(z), where H0(z) := sup
a∈R
{
az − 1
2
a2
}
=
1
2
z2,
and the supremum is attained by the optimal response â(z) = z. In particular, the agent
optimal response is unique. In the present setting, the lump sum payment ξ takes the form
ξ = Y Y0,Zτ = Y0 +
∫ τ
0
ZtdXt −
∫ τ
0
(
H0(Zt)
)
dt = Y0 +
∫ τ
0
ZtdXt −
∫ τ
0
1
2
Z2t dt.
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This representation is a direct consequence of the dynamic programming principle satisfied by
the agent dynamic value process. Given ξ = Y Y0,Zτ , the agent’s optimal control is α̂ = Z, and
V E0 (τ, ξ) = Y0.
Then, the main reduction result of Theorem 4.2 applies and provides
V PE = sup
(τ,ξ)∈CE
R
EP
α∗
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βtdXt − e−βτξ
]
= sup
Z∈V
sup
τ∈T
EP
Z
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βtZtdt− e−βτY R,Zτ
]
,
where
dXt = Ztdt+ dW
Z
t and dYt =
1
2
Z2t dt+ ZtdW
Z
t , P
Z-a.s.
By classical stochastic control theory, the HJB equation corresponding to this combined
optimal control and optimal stopping problem is
0 = min
{
v − v0 , βv − sup
z∈R
(1
2
z2(v′ + v′′) + z
)}
with v0(y) := −y, (5.1)
= min
{
v + y , βv +
1
2
(v′ + v′′)−1
}
, with v′ + v′′ < 0,
where the supremum is attained at ẑ(y) := −(v′ + v′′)−1.
By introducing the function u(s) := sv(ln s), for s > 0, we compute that u′(s) = (v+v′)(ln s)
and u′′(s) = 1
s
(v′ + v′′)(ln s), thus reducing the last ODE to
0 = min
{
u− u0 , βu+ 1
2u′′
}
, with u′′ < 0, and u0(s) := −s ln s. (5.2)
Notice that the strict concavity of u together with βu+ 12u′′ ≥ 0 imply that u > 0, and therefore
u must be increasing. We may explore the region where the solution u possibly coincides with
the obstacle u0(s) := −s ln s:
{u = u0} ⊆
{
βu0 +
1
2u′′0
≥ 0
}
=
{
− βs ln s− s
2
≥ 0
}
=
{
s ≤ s∗ := e− 12β
}
. (5.3)
This suggests to search for a solution of (5.2) of the form
un(s) = 1{s≤sn}u0(s) + 1{s>sn}u(s), for some sn ∈ (0, s∗], (5.4)
and some C2 function un ≥ u0 satisfying
β un +
1
2u′′n
= 0 on (sn,∞), with un(sn) = u0(sn), u′n(sn) = u′0(sn). (5.5)
The last ODE is equivalent to 2βu′′n +
1
un
= 0 which, after multiplying by u′n and direct inte-
gration and using the boundary condition in (5.5), provides
βu′n(s)
2 = cn − lnun(s), s ≥ sn, where cn := βu′0(sn)2 + lnu0(sn). (5.6)
By the smooth fit condition, we have u′n(sn) = u′0(sn) ≥ u′0(s∗) = 12β − 1 > 0 for β ∈ (0, 12). We
then search for an increasing candidate solution of the ODE√
βu′n(s) =
√
cn − lnun(s), s ≥ sn.
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Direct integration of this equation provides:
s− sn =
√
β
∫ s
sn
u′n(t)√
c− lnun(t)
dt = ecn
√
βπ
∫ cn−lnu0(sn)
cn−lnun(s)
γ(t)dt, s ≥ sn,
where γ(t) := e
−t√
πt
is the density function of the Γ(1, 12 ) distribution. Denoting by F the
corresponding cumulative distribution function, and recalling that cn − lnu0(sn) = βu′0(sn)2,
we see that
lnun(s) = cn − F−1
(
− s− sn
ecn
√
βπ
+ F
(
βu′0(sn)
2
))
, s ∈ [sn, s′n), (5.7)
where s′n is the maximum value of s such that the last equation has a solution:
s′n := sn + e
cn
√
βπF
(
βu′0(sn)
2
)
, and u(s′n) = e
cn , u′(s′n) = 0. (5.8)
At this point, we observe that s′n < ∞, so that the maximal increasing solution of the ODE
started from an arbitrary sn ∈ (0, s∗] is only defined up to the finite point s′n. However, if we
choose a sequence sn converging to zero, then u
′
0(sn) −→ ∞ and cn −→ ∞, so that s′n −→ ∞.
For this reason, in order to construct a solution of the ODE on the positive real line, we now
set
sn :=
1
n
, and we extend un to R+ by un(s) := un(s
′
n) = e
cn , for all n ≥ 1,
and we argue that the sequence (un)n is increasing. Indeed, un > u0 on (sn, s
′
n] because
u′′0(sn) < u
′′
n(sn) as sn < s
∗. Then, un+1(sn) > un(sn) and by standard comparison of the
solution of the ODE, we see that un+1 > un on (sn+1,∞).
Consequently, there exists a strictly concave increasing function u on R+, such that
un −→ u, pointwise and uniformly on compact subsets of R+, (5.9)
by the Dini theorem. This limiting function satisfies
u(0) = 0, u′(0) =∞, u(∞) =∞, u′(∞) = 0, and u > u0, βu+ 1
2u′′
= 0 on (0,∞),
and therefore induces the required classical solution v(y) = e−yu(ey) of the dynamic program-
ming equation (5.1).
Finally, by following a classical verification argument, we may show that the optimal contract(
τ̂ , ξ̂ := Ŷτ̂
)
is defined by:
Ŷt := R+
∫ t
0
ẑ
(
Ŷs
)
dXs −
∫ t
0
1
2
ẑ
(
Ŷs
)2
ds, and τ̂ := inf
{
t > 0 : Ŷt = 0
}
.
5.2 Sannikov [San08]
This section reports our understanding of the model in Sannikov [San08]. Given a European
contract C = (τ, π, ξ) proposed by the principal, the agent has a nonnegative increasing strictly
concave utility function U and a nonnegative increasing convex cost function h, and is solving:
sup
α
EP
α
[
e−rτU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
e−rt
(
U(πt)− h(αt)
)
dt
]
,
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where
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
αsds+ dW
α
s , t ≥ 0, Pα-a.s.,
and, as in the previous example, the agent’s effort α is an arbitrary progressively measurable
process taking values in some subset A ⊆ R and satisfying EP0[DPα|P0T ] = 1.
The Hamiltonian is given by
H(y, z, γ) = −ry + 1
2
Tr[γ] +H0(z), where H0(z) := sup
a∈A
{
az − h(a)},
and we assume for simplicity that the supremum is attained by the unique optimal response
â(z) = z. Then, similar to the example from the previous section, the lump sum payment ξ
promised at τ takes the form
U(ξ) = Y Y0,Zτ = Y0 +
∫ τ
0
ZtdXt +
∫ τ
0
(
rYt −H0(Zt)− U(πt)
)
dt,
and Y represents the continuation utility of the agent.
Remark 5.1. Before continuing, we make the crucial observation that the non-negativity con-
dition on U and h implies that Y ≥ 0. As the dynamics of the process Y are given by
dYt =
(
rYt + h ◦ â(Zt)− U(πt)
)
dt+ ZtdW
â(Z)
t , P
â(Z)-a.s.
under the optimal response of the agent, we see that 0 is an absorption point for the continuation
utility with optimal effort â = 0.
By the main reduction result of Theorem 4.2 we have
V PE := sup
Z∈V
sup
τ∈T
EP
Z
[∫ τ
0
e−rt
(
â(Zt)− πt
)
dt− e−rτU−1(Y R,Zτ )] ,
where
dXt = â(Zt)dt+ dW
â(Z)
t and dYt =
(
rYt + h ◦ â(Zt)− U(πt)
)
dt+ ZtdW
â(Z)
t , P
α̂(Z) − a.s.
thus leading to a mixed stochastic control and optimal stopping problem with reward function
upon stopping (or obstacle) v0 := −U−1. By classical stochastic control theory, the HJB
equation corresponding to this problem is
0 = min
{
v − v0, rv − ryv′ − sup
π
{− π − U(π)v′}− sup
z
{
aˆ(z) + h ◦ â(z)v′ + 1
2
z2v′′
}}
= min
{
v − v0, r(v − yv′) + inf
π
{
π + U(π)v′
}− sup
a
{
a+ h(a)v′ +
1
2
γ(a)2v′′
}}
, y ≥ 0,
by using the inverse optimal response function γ := â−1. Finally, it follows from Remark 5.1
together with the definition of the principal problem that the boundary condition at the left
boundary of the domain is v(0) = 0. We are then reduced to the obstacle problem
0 = min
{
v − v0 , r(v − yv′) + I(v′)− J(v′, v′′)
}
, y>0 and v(0) = 0, (5.10)
where, assuming further that U is C1 with U ′(0) =∞ and U ′(∞) = 0,
I(p) :=
(
(U ′)−1 + pU ◦(U ′)−1)(−1
p
)
and J(p, q) := sup
a∈A
{
a+ h(a)p+
1
2
γ(a)2q
}
. (5.11)
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5.3 An American contracting version of Sannikov [San08]
In the context of the previous example, let the agent utility function be such that U(0) = 0.
Given an American contract C = (τP, π), the agent problem is defined by:
V A(τP, π) := sup
τ,α
EP
α
[∫ τ∧τP
0
e−rt
(
U(πt)− h(αt)
)
dt
]
where
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
αsds+ dW
α
s , t ≥ 0, Pα-a.s.
The principal chooses optimally the contract by solving:
V PA := sup
τP,π
V A(τP,π)≥U(R)
EP
α̂
[∫ τP∧τ̂
0
e−rt
(
α̂t − πt
)
dt
]
,
where (τ̂ , α̂) denotes the optimal response of the agent to the proposed contract (τP, π). Ap-
plying the result of our main theorem, and following similar calculations as in the previous
example, we see that
V PA = sup
Y0≥R
V0(Y0), where V0(Y0) := sup
Z,π
E
[∫ T0
0
e−rt(â(Zt)− πt)dt
]
,
where â is the maximizer of the Hamiltonian, as defined in the previous example, and T0 :=
inf{t > 0 : Yt ≤ 0}, and the controlled state Y is defined by the dynamics:
dYt =
(
rYt + h ◦ α̂(Zt)− U(πt)
)
dt+ ZtdW
α̂(Z), Pα̂(Z)-a.s.
By standard stochastic control theory, we see that the dynamic programming equation corre-
sponding to this problem is
v(0) = 0, and r(v − yv′) + I(v′)− J(v′, v′′) on (0,∞),
where I and J are defined in (5.11). Notice that the last equation differs from (5.10) by the
absence of the obstacle constraint.
6 Density of revealing contracts
For (t, ω) ∈ J0, τK, define
Σt(ω, b) := (σtσ
⊤
t )(ω, b) and Σt(ω) :=
{
Σt(ω, b) ∈ S+d (R) : b ∈ B
}
.
We also introduce the inverse map which assigns to every squared diffusion Σ ∈ Σt(ω) the
corresponding set of generating controls
Bt(ω,Σ) :=
{
b ∈ B : (σtσ⊤t )(ω, b) = Σ
}
.
This allows us to isolate the partial maximization with respect to the squared diffusion in the
Hamiltonian H in (4.1):
Ht(ω, y, z, γ) = sup
Σ∈Σt(ω)
{
Ft(ω, y, z,Σ) +
1
2
Tr[Σγ]
}
,
19
where
Ft(ω, y, z,Σ) := sup
(a,b)∈A×Bt(ω,Σ)
{− ct(ω, a, b) − kt(ω, a, b)y + σt(ω, b)λt(ω, a) · z}.
We see that 2H is the convex conjugate of −2F . Let Σt(ω, b) 12 denote the corresponding square
root and consider
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
Σr(ω, βr)
1
2dWr. (6.1)
Clearly, any weak solution (P, β) of (6.1) is also a solution of (2.3). Let
Po := {Po ∈M1+(Ω) : (Po, β) is a weak solution of (2.3) for some β},
and notice that for any weak solution (Po, β) of (6.1) we have that for Po-almost every ω ∈ Ω
σ̂2t (ω) ∈ Σt(ω) and βt(ω) ∈ Bt
(
ω, σ̂2t (ω)
)
.
For any fixed diffusion coefficient, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the solutions
of (2.1) and (2.3) through Girsanov’s theorem. Define
Uo(Po) := {ν = (α, β), F-optional: αt(ω) ∈ A(ω), βt(ω) ∈ Bt(ω, σ̂2t (ω)) on R+, Po-a.s.},
and
Mo := {(Po, ν) : Po ∈ Po and ν ∈ Uo(Po)}.
Notice that we have a one-to-one correspondence between the set of control models M and the
set Mo by means of Girsanov’s theorem. We may rewrite the agent’s problem
V E(C) = sup
Po∈Po
V E(C,Po)
with
V E(C,Po) := sup
ν∈Uo(Po)
EP
ν
[
Kντ U(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cr(νr)
)
dr
]
.
where the measure Pν is defined by the Girsanov transformation
dPν
dPo
∣∣∣
Ft
= E
(∫ ·
0
λr(αr) · dWr
)
t
, t ≥ 0.
We now provide a representation of the agent’s value function by means of second-order back-
ward SDEs (2BSDEs) as introduced by Soner, Touzi and Zhang [STZ12]. We apply our recent
development of 2BSDE with random horizon and without the regularity conditions [LRTY18],
based on the work of Possama¨ı, Tan and Zhou [PTZ18].
Given a final payment ξ, we consider the 2BSDE
Yt∧τ = U(ξ) +
∫ τ
t∧τ
(
Fs(Ys, Zs, σ̂
2
s) + U(πs)
)
ds−
∫ τ
t∧τ
Zs · dXs +
∫ τ
t∧τ
dKs, P
o-a.s., (6.2)
for each Po ∈ Po.
Definition 6.1. For 1 < p < q and −µ ≤ η < ρ, the process (Y,Z,K) ∈ Dpη,τ
(Po,F+,Po) ×
Hpη,τ
(Po,FPo)× Ipη,τ (Po,FPo) is the solution of the 2BSDE (6.2), if
• for each Po ∈ Po, (Y,Z,K) satisfies (6.2) Po-a.s.
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• the nondecreasing process K satisfies the minimality conidtion: for all Po ∈ Po
Kt1∧τ =
Po
ess inf
P′∈P+(t1∧τ,Po)
EP
′
[
Kt2∧τ
∣∣∣F+,P′t1∧τ],
where
Po+(σ,P) :=
⋃
h>0
Po((σ + h) ∧ τ,P), Po(σ,P) := {P′ ∈ Po : P′ = P on Fσ}.
The definition of 2BSDE here is slightly different from that in [LRTY18]: the nondecreasing
processK is assumed to be aggregated, i.e., K is given as a unique process, and not as a family of
processes indexed by Po. Indeed, in general a family of processes {KPo}
Po∈Po is given through a
nonlinear Doob-Meyer or optional decomposition theorem, applied under each Po ∈ Po. Under
the usual set-theoretic framework ZFC and the continuum hypotheses, as in Nutz [Nut12], the
stochastic integral
∫ t
0 Zs · dXs can be defined pathwisely on Ω without the need for exclusion of
any null set and therefore does not depend on Po. Consequently, K does not depend on Po. In
other words,
{
KP
o}
Po∈Po can be aggregated into the resulting medial limit K, i.e., K
Po = K,
Po-a.s. for all Po ∈ Po.
Proposition 6.2. For all C ∈ C the 2BSDE (6.2) has a unique solution.
Proof. For (t, ω) ∈ R+ × Ω with t ≤ τ(ω) we introduce the dynamic versions Mo(t, ω) and
Po(t, ω) of the sets Mo and Po by considering the SDE (6.1) on Jt, τK starting at time t from
the path ω ∈ Ω.
(i). We first show that the family
{Po(t, ω) : (t, ω) ∈ J0, τK} is saturated, i.e., for all Po1 ∈
Po(t, ω) we have Po2 ∈ Po(t, ω) for every probability measure Po2 ∼ Po1 such that X is a Po2-
local martingale. To verify this, notice that the equivalence between Po1 and P
o
2 implies that the
quadratic variation of X is not changed by passing from Po1 to P
o
2. As X is a P
o
2-local martingale,
it follows that if (Po1, β) ∈ Mo(t, ω), then (Po2, β) ∈Mo(t, ω).
(ii). We next verify that the generator Fs(Ys, Zs, σ̂
2
s)+U(πs) satisfies the conditions of Lipschitz-
continuity, monotonicity and integrability. For all (t, ω) ∈ J0, τK and Σ ∈ Σt(ω)
|Ft(ω, y, z,Σ) − Ft(ω, y′, z′,Σ)| ≤ ‖kt‖∞|y − y′|+ ‖λt‖∞ sup
b∈Bt(ω,Σ)
∣∣σt(ω, b)⊤(z − z′)∣∣
= ‖kt‖∞|y − y′|+ ‖λt‖∞
∣∣Σ 12 (z − z′)∣∣,
for (y, z), (y′, z′) ∈ R×Rd, and
(y − y′)(Ft(ω, y, z,Σ) − Ft(ω, y′, z,Σ)) ≤ (y − y′) sup
(a,b)∈A×Bt(ω,Σ)
{− kt(ω, a, b)(y − y′)}
= − inf
(a,b)∈A×Bt(ω,Σ)
kt(ω, a, b)(y − y′)2,
for y, y′ ∈ R. As k, σ, λ are bounded, the generator is Lipschitz-continuous in (y, z) and mono-
tone in y. Notice that
Ft(ω, 0, 0,Σ) = sup
(a,b)∈A×Bt(ω,Σ)
{−ct(ω, a, b)}.
For f0s (ω) := Fs(ω, 0, 0, σ̂
2
s ) + U(πs) and
f0,t,ωs (ω
′) := Ft+s
(
ω ⊗t ω′, 0, 0, σ̂2s (ω′)
)
+ U
(
πt+s(ω ⊗t ω′)
)
= sup
(a,b)∈A×Bt+s(ω⊗tω′,σ̂2s(ω′))
{− ct+s(ω ⊗t ω′, a, b)}+ U(πt,ωs (ω′))
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we obtain for ~τ = τ t,ω − t that
EPo(t,ω)
[(∫ ~τ
0
e2ρr
∣∣f0,t,ωr ∣∣2dr) q2]
≤ Cq
{
EPo(t,ω)
[(∫ ~τ
0
e2ρr
∣∣ct,ωr ∣∣2dr) q2 ]+ EPo(t,ω)[(∫ ~τ
0
e2ρr
∣∣U(πt,ωr )∣∣2dr) q2 ]
}
<∞,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2.3 and (2.8).
The dynamic programming requirements of [PTZ18, Assumption 2.1] and [LRTY18, Lemma
6.6] follow from the more general results given in El Karoui and Tan [ET13, ET15].
Finally, as ξ satisfies the integrability condition (2.8), the required well-posedness result is
a direct consequence of [LRTY18, Theorem 3.3].
Now, we have the relation of the agent’s problem and 2BSDE.
Proposition 6.3. Let (Y,Z,K) be the solution of the 2BSDE (6.2). Then, we have
V E(C) = sup
Po∈Po
EP
o
[Y0].
Moreover, (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(C) if and only if
• ν̂ is a maximizer in the definition of F (Y,Z, σ̂2), dt⊗ P̂-a.e.
• Kτ = 0, P̂-a.s.
Proof. (i). By [LRTY18, Proposition 5.2], the solution of the 2BSDE (6.2) can be represented
as the supremum of the solutions of BSDEs
Y0 =
Po
ess sup
P′∈Po+(0,Po)
YP′0 , Po-a.s. for all Po ∈ Po, (6.3)
where for all Po ∈ Po, (YPo ,ZPo) is the solution of the following BSDE under Po
YPo0 = U(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
(
Fr
(YPor ,ZPor , σ̂2r)+ U(πr))dr − ∫ τ
0
ZPor · dXr −
∫ τ
0
dMP
o
r , P
o-a.s.
with a ca`dla`g (F+,P
o
,Po)-martingale MP
o
orthogonal to X. For all (Po, ν) ∈ Mo, consider the
linear BSDE with
YPo,ν0 = ξ +
∫ τ
0
(− cνr − kνrYPo,νr + σβr λαr · ZPo,νr + U(πr))dr
−
∫ τ
0
ZPo,νr · dXr −
∫ τ
0
dMP
o,ν
r , P
o-a.s.,
(6.4)
where cνr := cr(νr) and similar notations apply to k
ν , σβ, λα. Let Pν be the probability measure
equivalent to Po such that
dPν
dPo
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= E
(∫ ·
0
λαr dWr
)
t
, t ≥ 0,
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where W is a Brownian motion under Po. By Itoˆ’s formula
KντYP
o,ν
τ = YP
o,ν
0 −
∫ τ
0
KνrkνrYP
o,ν
r dr +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
cνr + k
ν
rYP
o,ν
r − σβr λαr · ZP
o,ν
r − U(πr)
)
dr
+
∫ τ
0
KνrZP
o,ν
r · dXr +
∫ τ
0
KνrdMP
o,ν
r
= YPo,ν0 −
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr +
∫ τ
0
KνrZP
o,ν
r · (dXr − σβr λαr dr) +
∫ τ
0
KνrdMP
o,ν
r ,
where Xt −
∫ t
0 σ
β
r λ
α
r dr =
∫ t
0 σ
β
r (dWr − λαr dr) is a martingale under Pν. Taking conditional
expectation
YPo,ν0 = EP
ν
[
KντU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr
∣∣∣∣F+0 ] , Po-a.s.
Observe that the affine generators in (6.4) are equi-Lipschitz by boundedness of k, σ, α, and
there is an ε-maximizer ν̂0 ∈ Uo(Po) for all ε > 0 which obviously induces a weak solution of the
corresponding SDE by Girsanov’s theorem. This means that the conditions of [EPQ97, Corol-
lary 3.1] are satisfied, and provides a representation of YPo0 as a stochastic control representation
for all Po ∈ Po as
YPo0 =
Po
ess sup
ν∈Uo(Po)
YPo,ν0 =
Po
ess sup
ν∈Uo(Po)
EP
ν
[
KντU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr
∣∣∣∣F+0 ] , Po-a.s. (6.5)
Then, for all Po ∈ Po, we obtain Po-a.s.
Y0 =
Po
ess sup
(P′,ν)∈Po+(0,Po)×Uo(P′)
EP
′ν
[
KντU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr
∣∣∣∣F+0 ]
=
Po
ess sup
(P′,ν)∈Mo,P′=Po on F+0
EP
′ν
[
KντU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr
∣∣∣∣F+0 ] .
By similar arguments as in the proof of [PTZ18, Lemma 3.5], we may show that the family{
EP
′ν
[
KντU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr
∣∣∣∣F+0 ] , (P′, ν) ∈ Mo}
is upward directed. Therefore, we may conclude that
sup
Po∈Po
EP
o
[Y0] = sup
Po∈Po
EP
o
[
Po
ess sup
(P′,ν)∈Mo,P′=Po on F+0
EP
′ν
[
KντU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr
∣∣∣∣F+0 ]
]
= sup
Po∈Po
sup
ν∈Uo(Po)
EP
ν
[
KντU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kνr
(
U(πr)− cνr
)
dr
]
= sup
Po∈Po
V E(C,Po) = V E(C).
(ii). Recall that we have one-to-one correspondence between the set of control models M
and the set Mo. From (i), (P̂o, ν̂) ∈ Mo is optimal if and only if V E(C) = Y0, P̂o-a.s., or
equivalently P̂ν̂-a.s. Consider Mo =
(
P̂o, ν̂
)
,
JE
(
M̂o,C
)
= EP̂
ν̂
[
Kν̂τU(ξ) +
∫ τ
0
Kν̂r
(
U(πr)− cν̂r
)
dr
]
.
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Using Itoˆ’s formula and (6.2), we obtain that
JE
(
M̂o,C
)
= Y0 + E
P̂ν̂
[∫ τ
0
Kν̂r
(− cν̂r − kν̂rYr + σβ̂r λα̂r · Zr − Fr(Yr, Zr, σ̂2r ))dr]
− EP̂ν̂
[∫ τ
0
Kν̂rdKr
]
.
Therefore,
(
P̂o, ν̂
)
is optimal if and only if ν̂ is a maximizer in the definition of F , dt⊗ P̂o-a.s.,
and Kτ = 0, P̂
o-a.s.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let C = (τ, π, ξ) ∈ CER. By definition, C ∈ C, M̂E(C) 6= ∅ and
V E(C) ≥ R. Consider the 2BSDE (6.2) with ξ. Notice that the integrability conditions,
Assumption 2.3 and 2.2, imply that the 2BSDE admits a unique solution (Y,Z,K) satisfying
‖Y ‖Dpη,τ (Po) + ‖Z‖Hpη,τ (Po) <∞, for η ∈ [−µ, ρ) and p ∈ (1, q).
By Proposition 6.3, we have Kτ = 0, P̂-a.s., for every
(
P̂, ν̂
) ∈ M̂E(C).
Fix some ε > 0 and define the absolutely continuous approximation of K by
Kεt :=
1
ε
∫ t
(t−ε)+
Ksds, t ≥ 0.
Clearly, Kε is FPo-predictable, nondecreasing Po-q.s. and
Kετ = 0, P̂-a.s. for all
(
P̂, ν̂
) ∈ M̂E(C). (6.6)
Define now the process
Y εt := Y0 −
∫ t
0
(
Fr
(
Y εr , Zr, σ̂
2
r
)
+ U(πr)
)
dr +
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr −
∫ t
0
dKεr . (6.7)
We may verify that (Y ε, Z,Kε) solves the 2BSDE (6.2) with terminal condition ξε := Y ετ and
generator F (y, z, σ̂2)+U(π). Indeed, as in the proof of the stability of SDEs, since Kετ ≤ Kτ and
the norms of K and Y are bounded, we may prove that ξε satisfies the integrability condition.
It follows by (6.6) that Kε satisfies the required minimality condition. By a priori estimation
we obtain that
‖Y ε‖Dp′
η′,τ
(Po) + ‖Z‖Hp′
η′,τ
(Po) <∞, for p′ ∈ (1, p) and η′ ∈ [−µ, η). (6.8)
We observe that a probability measure P satisfies Kτ = 0 P-a.s. if and only if it satisfies K
ε
τ = 0
P-a.s.
Define Cε := (τ, π, ξε). As Kε = K = 0, P̂-a.s., for any (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(C), we have Y ε = Y ,
P̂-a.s., in particular ξε = ξ, P̂-a.s. Since by Proposition 6.3 ν̂ is a maximizer in the definition of
F (Y,Z, σ̂2), ν̂ is a maximizer in the definition of F (Y ε, Z, σ̂2), dt⊗ P̂-a.e., which implies again
by Proposition 6.3 that (P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(Cε). The reverse direction holds also true. This implies
that M̂E(Cε) = M̂E(C) 6= ∅.
For (t, ω, y, z) ∈ J0, τK× R× Rd, notice that the map
γ 7→ Ht(ω, y, z, γ) − Ft
(
ω, y, z, σ̂2t (ω)
) − 1
2
Tr
[
σ̂2t (ω)γ
]
is surjective on (0,∞). Indeed, it is nonnegative by the definition ofH and F , convex, continuous
on the interior of its domain, and coercive by the boundedness of λ, σ, k. Let K˙ε denote the
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density of the absolutely continuous process Kε with respect to the Lebesgue measure. The
continuity allows us to use the classical measurable selection to find an F-predictable process
Γε such that
K˙εt = Ht(Y
ε
t , Zt,Γ
ε
t )− Ft
(
Y εt , Zt, σ̂
2
t
)− 1
2
Tr
[
σ̂2t Γ
ε
t
]
.
For K˙εt > 0, this is a consequence of surjectivity. In the case that K˙
ε
t = 0, as M̂E(C) =
M̂E(Cε) 6= ∅, it follows from Proposition 6.3 that Γεt can be chosen arbitrarily, for instance
choose Γεt = 0. It follows by substituting in (6.7) that we have the representation for Y
ε
Y εt := Y0 −
∫ t
0
(
Hr(Y
ε
r , Zr,Γ
ε
r) + U(πr)
)
dr +
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr + 1
2
∫ t
0
Tr
[
Γεrd〈X〉r
]
,
so that the contract Cε = (τ, π, ξε) =
(
τ, π, U−1
(
Y
Y ε0 ,Z,Γ
ε
τ
))
takes the required form (4.3).
It follows from (6.8) that the controlled process (Z,Γε) satisfies the integrability condition
required in the Definition 4.1 (i). By Step 1.b. in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we obtain for
(P̂, ν̂) ∈ M̂E(Cε) that
Ht(Y
ε
t , Zt,Γ
ε
t ) = ht(Y
ε
t , Zt,Γ
ε
t , ν̂), dt⊗ P̂-a.e.
Consequently, the requirement of Definition 4.1 (ii) is satisfied, and therefore (Z,Γε) ∈ V. By
Step 1.a. in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we obtain that Cε ∈ C.
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